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‘Do no harm’ is an enduring principle of medicine, yet people continue to be harmed in the process 
of being ‘cared for’.  Before 1990s, there was very little understanding that poor quality might be 
inherent in the structures and processes of the healthcare system (1). Now, as a result of 
considerable research investment, a great deal is known about, for example, hospital acquired 
infection, surgical error, medication error, and the systems and processes that predispose 
practitioners towards error.   Nevertheless, what it means to ‘care’ and how this might carry threats 
to safety has recently been exemplified by events at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust in the 
UK.  Here, there were consistently higher than average mortality rates and poor standards of care in 
which patients’ most basic needs were routinely overlooked; personal hygiene, nutrition and 
hydration were not maintained and patients were treated without compassion or respect for their 
dignity (2, 3).  Describing a pervasive culture of indifference to suffering and tolerance of poor 
standards of care, the public inquiry explicitly aligned a culture of staff disregard for patients’ dignity 
with threats to patient safety and drew attention to the value of compassion, kindness, and respect 
for dignity (3). The emphasis the ‘culture’ of healthcare work received as a result of events such as 
these further stimulated efforts to understand and, where necessary, change healthcare cultures.  
So although the scope of what is now considered to fall within the remit of ‘safety’ research has 
expanded to include concepts like culture, still things fall out of view. It has been suggested that the 
current emphasis of patient safety initiatives on ‘technical errors’ such as surgical mishaps and 
medication errors means that other harms are overlooked, and that ‘emotional distress’ should be 
considered a legitimate harm on the grounds that it is ‘unwise to ignore the frustrating and 
dehumanizing experiences that erode a relationship which has caring as its imperative’ (4).  Entwistle 
et al likewise argue that emotional harms are significant, and point to the connection between 
emotional and physical harm when they highlight how negative staff responses to patients who raise 
safety concerns ‘appeared to contribute to various forms of harm’, ‘undermining their confidence, 
and depressing their inclination and ability to contribute to their care in future’ (5).  Potentially, the 
need to quantify harm and measure the success of interventions to reduce it has channelled what is 
meant by ‘care’ and ‘harm’ in safety discourses to emphasise protocolised care and to focus on 
physical harm. It is a view difficult to escape when hospitals are obliged to demonstrate their 
awareness of safety by measurement and monitoring of such harms and to discharge their 
governance responsibilities through the development of safety policies and procedures.  There is, of 
course, a growing body of qualitative research that questions whether safety policies and formal 
measures, however strictly they are followed, are enough to secure safety (6, 7). Building on this 
impetus to conceptualise safety more broadly, we argue that there is a need to open up what is 
meant by care and harm, to explore a particular aspect of care and how it affects safety that (with 
some exceptions discussed below) does not feature largely in discourses on safety, that is, dignity.  
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Although there is lively debate about dignity in bioethics, with some dismissing it as a ‘useless 
concept’, meaning ‘nothing more than a capacity for rational thought and action’ (8), and others 
seeing dignity as a foundational principle, an innate quality possessed by individuals, an inalienable 
right and of intrinsic value (9), it is mostly treated as something separate, unrelated even, to safety.  
What is more, the philosophical meanings of dignity are not very well connected to the empirical 
work on dignified and safe care. Even in nursing studies, the philosophical and ethical notion of 
dignity has been stressed without connecting it to more empirical issues on safety (10). Here, as 
elsewhere, dignity is positioned as an ethical value important in its own right (11), integral to high 
quality care, professional education and training (12). Consequently, the connections with safety 
remain undeveloped. 
In contrast to the idea of dignity as an abstract value, we propose to define dignity as a social 
practice, as something that requires a certain sort of action: as something that can be threatened or 
promoted by caring practices. Pols et al explain that dignity may also be understood as a state that 
can be violated, for example, when patients are not assisted to the toilet in a timely manner and soil 
themselves. In such cases, the lack of dignity is often used to expose poor care situations (13). In 
countering these indignities, dignity is often promoted by encouraging practitioners to adopt a more 
attentive attitude towards patients and clients. For example, the “Dignity Challenge”, aimed to 
promote more dignified care by developing particular attitudes within the practitioners in their daily 
behaviour with their patients (14). However, dignified care is not simply attentive care, but is in itself 
a contested and social practice, that asks sometimes for difficult moral weighing of conflicting 
values. Introducing dignity as a social practice, we emphasise the comparative, contingent and 
ambivalent dimensions(9). The idea that dignity can be seen as something to be understood and 
managed in a uniform, transparent and even measurable way is  too simplistic.  In developing this 
idea of dignity as a social practice, we make room for other, sometimes conflicting, values and 
dimensions of care, such as safety. Therefore, in this paper, we argue for the need to bring these 
two concepts together and that their relationship deserves more attention in research, policies and 
practice.   
Opening up the dynamics of the dignity-safety relationship  
 
Exploring the relationship between dignity and safety requires a close look at how these concepts 
are understood and enacted in everyday healthcare practices. In practice, dignity and safety shape 
each other in ways that as yet are poorly understood; sometimes there are trade-offs where 
prioritising safety might come at the cost of a person’s dignity, but sometimes there are mutualities 
where caring about a person’s dignity also results in safer care.  Therefore, the ways dignity and 
safety are configured in situated practices holds consequences for both the quality and safety of 
care.   
Hillman et al (15) describe a situation in which safety was traded against dignity.  They illustrate how 
a falls reduction target on an elderly care ward promoted a culture of restriction of patients, and 
defensive nursing practices.  To reduce the risk of falling, patients were encouraged to remain in 
their beds and chairs and to use commodes and bedpans instead of walking to the toilet. These 
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measures safeguard a certain level of safety but brought with them a reduction in dignified care.  
Staff, on the other hand, felt under threat of complaints and protected themselves by record-
keeping, paradoxically at the expense of care-giving.  When enacted this way, safety came at the 
cost of dignity.  Because healthcare organisations are complex socio-technical systems where cause 
and effect are not related in a linear way, there is far more to patient safety and quality of care than 
the following of measurable policies and interventions with predetermined definitions of safety.  
Pols et al (13) describe a complex situation wherein different versions of dignity aligned with or 
threatened safety.  A man insisted he be allowed to die at home despite poor economic 
circumstances which meant electricity and gas supplies had been terminated.  Without electric to 
light the property, and to move the electric bed (to which he was at this point bound), and without 
gas to heat the property, community nurses were not permitted to attend.   Lacking nursing care, 
proper heating and lighting, it was neither a safe nor dignified environment for a man to die in, yet 
to move the man to an inpatient setting would override his most vehement wish.  By adhering to his 
wishes, rather than prioritising his safety and physical comfort, the man maintained a situated, albeit 
imperfect, form of dignity.  This example demonstrates why, as Aranda and Jones argue, simplistic, 
uniform or formulaic practices of respecting dignity are inadequate (9).  In addressing undignified 
care – whether as a threat to safety (as detailed in the Mid Staffordshire case outlined above) or as a 
consequence of interventions to improve safety (as in the case of the falls reduction target discussed 
above) - the complexity of care should be recognised, including the contingency, inherent conflicts of 
value, and sometimes the impossibility of achieving an outcome that satisfies the demands of 
differing understandings of dignity and safety and their priority.  
Therefore, we propose to move from dominant discourses of safety and dignity that limit 
exploration of the relationship between these two concepts and towards an understanding that is 
rooted in their co-creation through practices of healthcare delivery.  Within safety discourses, there 
already exists the argument to view safety as a practice, paying close attention to the circumstances 
of its production.  Dekker and Hollnagel (16) argue that safety should be seen as ‘dynamic, 
interactive, communicative acts that are created as people conduct work (…) and gather experiences 
from it’. Likewise, for us, dignity involves recognition of the person that you are, and it should be 
seen as contingent and experienced, bestowed or earned through interaction in social settings (9).  
Dignity is therefore to be seen as a social and contested practice in which respecting the dignity of a 
person does not involve valuing and treating her as a case of generic personhood, but more as the 
concretely particular person she is (17). As such, we suggest that greater emphasis should be paid to 
examining personhood as a holistic concept that incorporates a range of key dimensions including 
the physical, relational, emotional and spiritual aspects of people and their social interactions. In 
short, dignified and safe care is an experienced and embodied practice that implies moral work with 
its own complexities, including, sometimes, moral trade-offs. 
Healthcare practices, however, are shaped in important ways by the context in which they are 
enacted.  Indeed, ‘shaped’ is perhaps understating the matter.  Cultures of healthcare work inform 
and are informed by practices in a reciprocal and continually evolving way.  Drawing on social and 
anthropological understandings, culture should be viewed, not as ‘a thing’, ‘out there’ (18,) but as 
historically contingent local practices that interact in complex ways with external bodies and 
discourses outside the workplace such as shifting policy contexts (19), the standards, norms and 
values of professional bodies (20), the politics and hierarchies within and between different staff 
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groups (21).  Therefore, in the context of healthcare work, we understand ‘culture’ as the dynamic, 
contestable and emergent configuration of values, competencies and practices, through which 
dignity and safety are enacted.  Safety and dignity are thus intertwined and practiced relationally 
within particular social and cultural contexts.  It is through this safety-dignity co-shaping that 
dynamic trade-offs are created both within and across different healthcare contexts. By way of 
example, Tadd et al (22) explain how financial incentives and targets (for example of 97% bed 
occupancy) work against patient-centred care central to treating people with dignity (when it results 
in repeatedly relocating patients so that it disorients or exacerbates confusion).  They argue that 
practices such as these ‘results in a culture that is risk averse and often defensive, where care is 
undervalued; a culture where professional accountability and discretion is replaced by standardised 
checklists, pathways and audits resulting in the view that if an aspect of care can’t be measured it 
doesn’t matter; a culture where getting the job done matters more than how the job is done, so that 
the focus is primarily on the tasks rather than seeing the people who matter’.  Such an 
understanding of dignity and safety as culturally embedded practices is thereby sensitive to the 
macro-, meso- and micro-level characteristics of particular organisational settings and the impact of 
issues such as inter-professional power dynamics, professional-patient-family relationships, and 
formal and informal communication on the potential to enact safe dignity and dignified safety in 
particular ways. 
Conclusion: Researching dignity and safety as culturally embedded 
practices  
 
We have argued that the relationship between dignity and safety is underexplored and that the 
effects of the various dignity-safety configurations are currently poorly understood.  Research is 
needed to explore the complex web of relations between safety and dignity – the way practices of 
safety and dignity are embedded within, and informed by, local health care contexts and the actions 
and understandings of professionals, patients and families.  This is important as sometimes 
interventions to improve safety can have unintended consequences that are counterproductive or 
that can detract from the quality of care by overriding concerns for patients’ dignity.  To explore the 
various dignity-safety configurations and their effects, we suggest that a critical and reflexive 
approach to quality and safety research and improvement is necessary. This approach requires 
listening to different participants in care as they are invited to reflect on their moral understandings 
about their identities and practices as people, professionals, carers and so forth,  what is valued in 
relationships, and how this informs healthcare practices.  Importantly, reflection and discussion are 
also necessary to analyse the inherent complexities and trading off that occurs between the 
different values involved, such as safety and dignity.  Likewise, it requires uncovering local everyday 
inter-professional practices by which inevitable, often less predictable risks are managed and 
mitigated by practitioners using their tacit knowledge, innovation and flexibility (23).  In this 
reflection, to normatively evaluate practices, we endorse an empirically nourished ethics that is 
acutely aware of its situatedness, that is, ethics is the practice of particular people in particular 
times, places, cultures and professional environments (24).  We propose that the methodologies 
best suited to accessing practices that secure and threaten dignity and safety across different 
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organisational settings, and to facilitating empirically nourished ethics, are research methodologies 
such as ethnography, video reflexive ethnography, and participatory action research.  
Ethnography is an established research approach, well attuned to the close and detailed study of 
cultures.  Its objective is ‘to describe the lives of people other than ourselves, with an accuracy and 
sensitivity honed by detailed observation and prolonged first-hand experience’ (25).  Ethnography 
focuses on local knowledge and is sensitive to the intricacies of micro-level processes and practices.  
Pink and Morgan (26) advocate a short, intensive form of ethnography using video.  They argue that 
it maintains the first-hand involvement of the ethnographer as a core way to learn about other 
people’s lives, practical activity and the unspoken, sensory and tacit elements of everyday life.  
Moreover, video not only provides rich visual data but re-viewing the recordings works as an 
ongoing intensive form of engagement with the field.  This intensity becomes part of the way the 
researcher comes to understand and empathise with participants.  An approach that capitalises on 
the benefits of video-ethnography and couples it with a collaborative and interventionist approach is 
‘Video Reflexive Ethnography’ (VRE) (27). In addition to the methods described above, VRE requires 
participants and researchers to work in productive partnership and reflexively analyse video footage 
of practitioners’ own practice (28).  Such analyses produce nuanced understandings of practice in all 
its complexity, aspects of which might otherwise be taken-for-granted, and provides the basis for 
practitioner-led interventions to enhance practice (28).  Participatory action research is another 
research approach defined by its involvement of participants and interventionist design.  
Participatory action research is usually multimethod, often mixed method, multiperspectival, and 
‘seeks change in what people do, how they interact with the world and with others, what people 
mean, what they value, and the discourses in which people understand and interpret their world’ 
(29).   The added value of these latter two approaches lies in their collaborative and interventionist 
nature.  For these approaches research into practice is not a further step after publication, rather 
participant-led change is an integral step in the research and a way of fulfilling the potential for 
improvement made possible through the research process. Importantly, both participatory action 
research and the VRE method provide the actual means for practitioners to tap into group wisdom 
and explore the way dignity and safety are practiced relationally within the particularities of their 




(1) Vincent C. Patient Safety. 2nd Ed.  Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell; 2010. 
(2) Francis R. (Chair)  Independent Inquiry into care provided by Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust January 2005 – March 2009, Volume I. London: The Stationery Office; 2010. 
(3) Francis R. (Chair) Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry: Executive 
Summary.  London: The Stationery Office; 2013. 
 BMJ Q&S: Viewpoint 
R2 
 
(4) Kuzel AJ, Woolf SH, Gilchrist VJ, Engel JD, LaVeist TA, Vincent C, Frankel RM. Patient Reports of 
Preventable Problems and Harms in Primary Health Care. Annals of Family Medicine.  2004:2(4):333-
340. 
(5) Entwistle VA, McCaughan D, Watt  IS, Birks Y, Hall J, Peat M, Williams B, Wright J and for the PIPS 
(Patient Involvement in Patient Safety) group. Speaking up about safety concerns: multi-setting 
qualitative study of patients’ views and experiences. Quality and Safety in Health Care. 2010;19:1-7.  
(6) Iedema R, Jorm C, Braithwaite J, Travaglia J, Lum M. A root cause analysis of clinical error: 
confronting the disjunction between formal rules and situated clinical activity. Social Science & 
Medicine. 2006;63(5):1201-1212. 
(7) Patterson ES. Structuring flexibility: the potential good, bad and ugly in standardisation of 
handovers. Quality and Safety in Health Care. 2008;17(1):4-5. 
(8) Macklin R. Dignity is a useless concept. BMJ. 2003; 327: 1419-1420. 
(9) Aranda K, Jones A.  Dignity in health-care: a critical exploration using feminism and theories or 
recognition. Nursing Inquiry.  2010; 17 (3): 248-256. 
(10) Gallagher A.  Editorial: What do we know about dignity in care.  Nursing Ethics. 2011; 18 (4): 
471-473. 
(11) Shotton L, Seedhouse D. Practical dignity in caring. Nursing Ethics. 1998: 5 (3): 246-255. 
(12) Chadwick A.  A dignified approach to improving the patient experience: Promoting privacy, 
dignity and respect through collaborative training.  Nurse Education in Practice. 2012; 12: 187-191. 
(13) Pols J, Pasveer B, Willems D. The particularity of dignity: relational engagement in care at the 
end of life.  Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy. 2017 (online first). 
(14) Department of Health. Final report on the review of the Department of Health Dignity in Care 
Campaign. 2009. 
https://www.dignityincare.org.uk/_assets/Opinion_Leader_Final_Report_to_DH.doc.pdf 
(15) Hillman A, Tadd W, Calnan S, Calnan M, Bayer A, & Read, S. Risk, governance and the experience 
of care. Sociology of Health & Illness. 2013; 35(6): 939-955. 
(16) Dekker S, Hollnagel E. Human factors and folk models. Cognition, Technology & Work.  2004; 6 
(2): 79-86. 
(17) Verkerk MA.  Care Ethics as a Feminist Perspective on Bioethics.  In: Gastmans C, Dierickx K, Nys 
H, Schotsmans P. (Eds). New Pathways for European Bioethics. Antwerpen: Intersentia; Holmes 
Beach, FL: Gaunt, Inc., 2007: 65-80. 
(18) Taylor JS. The Story Catches You and You Fall Down: Tragedy, Ethnography, and ''Cultural 
Competence".  Medical Anthropology Quarterly.  2003; 17 (2); 159–181.  
 BMJ Q&S: Viewpoint 
R2 
 
(19) Davies HTO, Mannion R.  Will prescriptions for cultural change improve the NHS? BMJ  2013; 
345. 
(20) Goodwin D.  Cultures of caring: healthcare ‘scandals’, inquiries, and the remaking of 
accountabilities.  In press.  Social Studies of Science.  
(21) Grant S, Guthri B, Entwistle V, Williams B. A meta-ethnography of organisational culture in 
primary care medical practice. Journal of Health Organization and Management. 2014; 28(1): 21-40. 
(22) Tadd W, Hillman A, Calnan S, Calnan M, Bayer T, Read S. Right place – wrong person: dignity in 
the acute care of older people. Quality in Ageing in Older Adults. 2011;12(1):33-43. 
(23) Mesman J. ‘Resources of Strength: an exnovation of hidden competences to preserve patient 
safety’. In: E. Rowley & J. Waring (Eds.) A Socio-Cultural Perspective on Patient Safety. Farnham: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd: 2011. p71-94.  
(24) Lindemann H, Verkerk MA, Walker MA (Eds).  Naturalized Bioethics. Towards Responsible 
Knowing and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2008 
(25) Ingold T. Anthropology is Not Ethnography.  Proceedings of the British Academy 2008: 154: 69-
92.  
(26) Pink S, Morgan J.  Short-Term Ethnography: Intense Routes to Knowing. Symbolic Interaction. 
2013Vol. 36, Issue 3, pp. 351–361 
(27) Iedema R, Mesman J, Carroll K. (2013) Visualising Health Care Practice Improvement: Innovation 
from within. CRC Press (formerly: Radcliffe Publishers): London. 
(28) Carroll K, Iedema R, Kerridge R.  Reshaping ICU Ward Round Practices Using Video-Reflexive 
Ethnography.  Qualitative Health Research. 2008; 18 (3): 380-390. 
(29) Westhues A, Ochocka J, Jacobson N, Simich L, Maiter S, Janzen R, Fleras A. Developing Theory 
From Complexity: Reflections on a Collaborative Mixed Method Participatory Action Research Study. 
Qualitative Health Research. 2008; 18(5): 701-717. 
 
